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Abstract
Formal methods have been proved successful in analyzing diﬀerent kinds of security protocols. They
typically formalize and study the security guarantees provided by cryptographic protocols, when
executed by a (possibly unbounded) number of diﬀerent participants. A key problem in applying
formal methods to cryptographic protocols, is the study of multi-protocol systems, where diﬀerent
protocols are concurrently executed. This scenario is particularly interesting in a global computing
setting, where several diﬀerent security services coexist and are possibly combined together. In
this paper, we discuss how the tagging mechanism presented in [4,5] addresses this issue.
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1 Introduction
Security protocols are designed to provide diverse security guarantees in possi-
bly hostile environments: typical guarantees include the secrecy of a message
exchange between two trusted entities, the freshness and authenticity of a
message, the authenticity of a claimed identity, . . . and more. The presence
of hostile entities makes protocol design complex and often error prone, as
shown by many attacks to long standing protocols reported in the literature
(see, e.g., [6,7,13,18,19]). In most cases, such attacks dwell on ﬂaws in the
protocols’ logic, rather than on breaches in the underlying cryptosystem. In-
deed, even when cryptography is assumed as a fully reliable building-block,
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an intruder can engage a number of potentially dangerous actions, notably,
intercepting/replaying/forging messages, to break the intended protocol in-
variants. Formal methods have proved very successful as tools for protocol
design and validations.
On the one hand, several model-checking techniques have been applied
to analyze security protocols (see, e.g., [17,19]), leading to the discovery of
several attacks. However, their precision is balanced by the necessity to ex-
plore all the possible message sequences, generated during the execution of the
protocol. Therefore the analysis of an unbounded number of participants, pos-
sibly running diﬀerent and unknown protocols, turns out to be infeasible. On
the other hand, static analysis techniques like, e.g., type systems [1,9,10] and
control ﬂow [2,3], aim at proving a property of a program (a protocol in our
case) by only inspecting the source code. They are appealing because (i) only
the code is inspected and there is no need of generating and exploring all the
possible execution sequences; (ii) by exploiting compositionality, it becomes
feasible to (even automatically) prove correctness of protocols with unbounded
number of sessions and participants. Compositionality is also appealing for
studying multi-protocol systems, since it might give local guarantees of cor-
rectness, without analyzing the system as a whole. These advantages are
payed by approximating the property of interest thus loosing precision: static
analyses are typically sound (an incorrect protocol is never validated) but not
complete, as there might be false-negative, i.e., correct protocols that cannot
be validated.
Typically, the approaches mentioned above study the interactions among
principals running the same protocol in an untrusted environment. The in-
teraction among diﬀerent protocols, possibly carrying out some common sub-
tasks, is considered an open issue [16], and it is particularly interesting in a
global computing setting, where several security services coexist and are pos-
sibly combined together. As a matter of fact, this kind of interaction may be
tricky. As an example, let us consider the two following simple protocols:
α.1) B → A : n
α.2) A → B : {B,M, n}kAB
β.1) A → B : A,M
β.2) B → A : {B, n,M}kAB
β.3) A → B : n
The ﬁrst protocol is the well-known ISO-Two-Pass Authentication protocol:
B sends out a nonce, namely a random challenge, which is encrypted by
A together with the identity label of B and the message she is willing to
authenticate. The encryption key kAB is a key shared between A and B. When
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B receives that message, and checks its freshness by verifying the equality of
the nonces, he is guaranteed that M is authentic from A. In protocol β,
A sends as cleartext a message M , for instance a broadcast message, and
her identity label. In the second message, B asks A to authenticate that
message, by sending a ciphertext, encrypted with a long term key shared with
A, containing the identity label B , a fresh nonce n and the message M . A
may conﬁrm by publishing n.
The two protocols are safe when they use diﬀerent keys. However, they are
aﬀected by the following attack when the same key is exploited for carrying
on both the protocols:
α.1) B → I(A) : n
β.1) I(A) → B : A, n
β.2) B → I(A) : {B, nA, n}kAB
α.2) I(A) → B : {B, nA, n}kAB
B starts protocol α sending a fresh nonce for authenticating A, the enemy in-
tercepts and reﬂects it, together with the identity label A, to another instance
of B running protocol β . B mistakes the nonce for the broadcast message
of protocol β and asks A to authenticate that message. The enemy reﬂects
the third message to B who mistakes that message for the ciphertext of the
second protocol, so authenticating A. Unfortunately, A is not present in the
authentication task! The attack exploits the structural equality between the
two ciphertexts.
In [4,5], we propose a static analysis for authentication, based on the ρ-
spi calculus. The analysis is compositional: each principal is separately type-
checked. The main theorem ensures that the parallel composition of correct
principals is safe. Our notion of safety formalizes the agreement property pro-
posed by Lowe [14]: "whenever Bob completes the initiator role, apparently
with Alice, then Alice has previously been running the responder role, ap-
parently with Bob, in the same authentication task. Moreover Alice and Bob
agree on the message m to be authenticated".
Compositionality is achieved by exploiting a tagging mechanism. This
suﬃces for expressing the authentication guarantees carried out by each ci-
phertext, regardless to the particular authentication protocol originating it.
In this paper we discuss how that tagging mechanism applies to multi-protocol
systems.
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2 Tags for Authentication
Table 1 Tagging Scheme
POSH
B → A : n
A → B : {Id(I),Auth(M), R(n)}k
I R k
A Claim key(A,B)
B Verif key(A,B)
B Verif keypriv(A)
SOPH
B → A : {Id(I),Auth?(M), Rpublic?(n)}k
A → B : n
I R k
A Claim key(A,B)
B Verif key(A,B)
B Verif keypub(A)
SOSH
B → A : {Id(I),Auth?(MB), Rsecret?(n)}kA
A → B : {Rsecret(n),Auth(MA)}kB
I R kI(I = A,B)
A Claim key(A,B)
B Verif key(A,B)
B Verif keypub(I)
Messages used in authentication protocols are often ambiguous. For in-
stance, let us consider the following simple ciphertext: {A, n,m}kAB . A ﬁrst
ambiguity regards the role of each message component: n might be a nonce
and m a message to be authenticated, but also the opposite might be true.
Even when a single protocol is executed, this kind of ambiguity often causes
attacks, referred to as type-ﬂaws. Furthermore, a second, more tricky, level
of ambiguity is possible: the ciphertext might be sent from A to B for au-
thenticating M (as in protocol α) or for asking B whether or not he agrees
on M (for instance, M might be a fresh session key created by A); but, it
might be sent also from B to A with the same goals. This ambiguity often
causes attacks when multiple sessions of a single protocol are executed but, of
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course, the situation is even worse in multi-protocol systems: as discussed by
Syverson and Meadows in [15], “problems can arise when a protocol is inter-
acting with another protocol that does not use a tagging scheme, or tags data
in a diﬀerent way”. We propose a tagging mechanism, uniformly applicable to
diﬀerent authentication protocols, preventing both the forms of ambiguities.
Ciphertexts may contain an identity label, which can specify the claimant
or the veriﬁer of the authentication task. A nonce is typically used for guaran-
teeing the freshness of ciphertexts. Ciphertexts may also contain a message to
be authenticated. Protocols are usually divided into three classes, according to
the nonce-handshake [10,12]: in Public-Out Secret-Home (POSH), the nonce
is sent as cleartext and received into a ciphertext, in Secret-Out Public-Home
(SOPH) the opposite happens, while in Secret-Out Secret-Home (SOSH),
the nonce is sent out and received back into (diﬀerent) ciphertexts. Proto-
col α, in §1, uses a POSH nonce handshake, while protocol β is based on
a SOPH . As an example of SOSH nonce handshake, let us consider the
following protocol:
γ.1) B → A : {n,B,MB}k+
A
γ.2) A → B : {n,MA}k+
B
The ﬁrst message is encrypted with the public key of A. By that ciphertext,
B asks A whether or not she agrees on MB and she is willing to authenticate
herself with B, which is the veriﬁer of the authentication session. This part of
the nonce-handshakes is exactly the same as in SOPH nonce handshakes. The
second message diﬀers, however, since the nonce is kept secret (it is encrypted
with the public key of B and cannot be read by the enemy). By sending back
that nonce, A conﬁrms the request received from B, as in the SOPH nonce-
handshake, but also authenticates MA which is originated by A and is sent
encrypted together with the secret nonce. In this sense, the second message
combines the properties of the POSH and the SOPH nonce-handshakes.
Table 1 summarizes the three nonce-handshakes and how they can be typed
according as the nonce-handshake.
POSH The ciphertext may be encrypted either by a key shared between A and
B, or by the private key of A. In the former case, an identity label must
appear for disambiguating the originator and the intended receiver of the
ciphertext 3 . If the identity label is A, then the nonce is tagged by Claim,
since A is the claimant of the authentication session. If it is B, then
the nonce is tagged by Verif , since B is the veriﬁer. In the latter case,
3 The identity label and the nonce are necessary in order to prevent reﬂection and replay
attacks, respectively (for details see [6,8]).
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an identity label is required for specifying the intended veriﬁer of the
authentication session. Hence, the nonce is tagged by Verif .
SOPH The ciphertext may be encrypted either by a key shared between A and
B, or by the public key of A 4 . Message components are tagged sim-
ilarly to the previous case; tags are interrogative, since B is asking A
whether or not she agrees on M and is willing to accept B as veriﬁer of
the authentication task. The subscript public speciﬁes that the nonce is
supposed to be sent as cleartext in case of conﬁrm.
SOSH This nonce-handshake combines the two previous ones. The nonce is kept
secret, so only A can send back that nonce: this motivates the subscript
secret. When encrypting that nonce inside the second ciphertext, A may
also authenticate a fresh message, which is tagged by Auth.
These patterns may be combined together since a ciphertext might contain,
for instance, two nonces used in diﬀerent kind of nonce-handshakes. Moreover,
as shown in [4] for the POSH nonce-handshake, this tagging scheme scales
up when Trusted Third Parties (TTP ) are involved in the protocol and when
session keys are used for achieving authentication.
3 Tagging and Multi-Protocol Systems
The tagging mechanism proposed here solves the two kinds of ambiguities
discussed in §2: nonces, messages and identity labels are univocally deter-
mined. Moreover, tags show who is the originator and the intended receiver
of the ciphertext and whether it represents a challenge or an answer in the
authentication task.
Moreover, tags explicitly indicate the authentication guarantees conveyed
by ciphertexts. Indeed, they do not depend on the protocol originating them:
assuming all the participants to agree on this tagging mechanism, tags allow a
local reasoning. For instance, if A receives a ciphertext which is an answer to
a challenge sent previously to B, then A may authenticate B, independently
of the particular protocol B is running. The only assumption on that protocol
is that it respects our tagging mechanism.
This form of compositionality, formalized in [4,5], allows us to reason on
multi-protocol systems, where principals do not know anything on the world
around them.
As an example, let us go back to the two protocols in §1: we argue that
4 The private key of A cannot be used since the nonce is supposed to be sent back only in
case of conﬁrm by A: a ciphertext encrypted with the private key of A would be read by
the enemy which might send back the nonce.
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the ciphertext in protocol α can be tagged as {Id(B),Auth(M),Verif(n)}kAB ,
since A is specifying B as veriﬁer of the authentication task. In protocol β, the
ciphertext can be tagged as {Id(B),Verifpublic?(n), Auth?(M)}kAB , since B is
asking A whether she is willing to authenticate M with B, namely, the veriﬁer
of the authentication task. Notice that the type-ﬂaw attack is not possible on
the tagged version of the protocols, since message M and nonce n are tagged
diﬀerently and the tag of the nonce shows that, in protocol α, the ciphertext
represents a response, while in protocol β it represents a challenge.
An interesting point is that there might be diﬀerent ways of tagging a
protocol. For instance, let us consider a simple variant of protocol β in §1.
β ′.1) B → A : n
β ′.2) A → B : {A,B,M, n}kAB
The ciphertext can be tagged either as {Id(A), B,Auth(M),Claim(n)}kAB or
as {A, Id(B),Auth(M), Verif(n)}kAB . Notice that the tagging is necessary for
preserving the safety in a multi-protocol system, where protocol β ′ is executed
concurrently with another variant:
β ′′.1) B → A : n
β ′′.2) A → B : {B,A,M, n}kAB
Indeed, the untagged version of the two protocols is aﬀected by the following
attack:
β ′′.1) B → I(A) : n
β ′.1) I(A) → B : n
β ′.2) B → I(A) : {B,A,M, n}kAB
β ′′.2) I(A) → B : {B,A,M, n}kAB
4 Conclusion and Related Work
Multi-protocol systems are an emerging issue in the research on security pro-
tocols analysis [16]. Untrusted environments do not contain only Dolev-Yao
intruders, but also trusted principals running diﬀerent protocols. The interac-
tion between diﬀerent protocol sessions may be tricky, and diﬃcult to analyze.
In [11], Guttman and Thayer prove, in the Strand Spaces formalism [12],
that if the sets of encrypted messages that the diﬀerent protocols handle are
disjoint, then the concurrent execution of those protocols is safe. In other
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words, a suﬃcient condition for guaranteeing safety is the following: if a pro-
tocol uses a message, then no other protocol should construct a message of
that form. Intuitively, in a global computing setting, it is necessary to avoid
confusion among diﬀerent protocols in order to safely implement security ser-
vices.
Indeed, this condition can be simply implemented: protocol designers
might agree to allow an independent body to choose their protocol-speciﬁc
identiﬁers for them. Alternatively, designers might choose them randomly,
following some common algorithm guaranteeing a negligible probability of
collisions.
We approach the problem from the opposite perspective: we do not prevent
interaction among diﬀerent protocols. On the contrary, we prove [4,5] that
the communication among diﬀerent protocols agreeing on our tagging scheme
results to be safe.
Tagged messages explicitly indicate the authentication guarantees they
provide, so allowing a principal to accept authentication regardless of the pro-
tocol the other party is running. Moreover, also the generation of tagged
messages is ruled by a local reasoning (see [4,5] for details). This may be
thought of as a ﬁrst step towards an ideal notion of protocol-independent
communication, where the security goal is achieved by simply adhering to a
shared tagged scheme.
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